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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of production-related strategies to serve a market
from the perspectives of foreign firms and host governments. The analysis is based on
a static as well as a dynamic context. The paper shows that the optimal strategy for a
foreign firm does not promote the maximum social welfare for the host country. Because
of this conflict, host governments tend to impose some restrictions on foreign firms' entry
strategies. Counter strategies that foreign firms may adopt in response to such restrictions
are suggested.

Introduction
The internationalization of the world economy broadens the definition of the market
and creates both opportunities and threats for firms. Foreign markets are opportunities
for future growth and for exploiting market power. On the other hand, however, domestic
firms have to compete with foreign firms in domestic as well as in foreign markets. These
strategic thrusts have led more and more firms move toward internationalization either
offensively or defensively. Firms have to gain a foothold in important markets in order to
compete effectively with firms from other countries (Ohmae, 1985; Porter, 1986). Thus, a
primary concern of the top management is to establish and operate successfully a portfolio
of businesses across a number of geographic markets (Channon and Jalland, 1978). The
strategy used for serving a specific country is crucial for the accomplishment of the strategic
mission of internationalization.
A firm can use different strategies to serve a foreign market. These strategies can be
classified into two categories: home production-related strategies and foreign production-
related strategies (Terpstra, 1987). The foreign production-related strategies are gaining
increasing importance nowadays for several reasons. First, host country governments en-
courage foreign firms to produce locally, and they provide certain incentives or impose
some constraints to achieve this objective. Second, foreign firms can take advantage of
the lower labor cost in the host country, especially in developing countries. Third, local
production allows better interaction with local needs and thus has the potential of yield-
ing higher profits. And finally, oligopolistic reaction research shows that once the leader
invests in a foreign country, other firms in the industry will follow suit, in an attempt to
maintain competitive balance (Knickerbocker, 1973; Yu and Ito, forthcoming). However,
in the interest of social welfare, the host government frequently intervenes in the entry of
foreign firms. In response to host government interventions, foreign firms must formulate
counter entry strategies which obviously depend upon the type of government intervention.
This paper, based on an economic model, investigates the payoffs to foreign firms under
different strategies in serving a market. Since the foreign firm's strategy is affected by host
governments' policies, it is necessary to find out host governments' preference, which is
determined by social welfare. Thus, the social welfare derived by different strategies has
to be considered. The conflicts between foreign firms and host governments due to the
different payoffs resulting from different strategies are demonstrated. It then discusses the
foreign firms' optimal strategies both with and without government intervention. Payoffs
to various strategies are examined both in a static and a dynamic context.
This paper has three distinctive features. First, it enriches previous analysis by exam-
ining four foreign production-related strategies: foreign direct investment (a wholly-owned
subsidiary), licensing, joint venture (partial equity holding), and a combination of joint
venture and licensing. 1 There are two variants for the licensing strategy, exclusive licens-
ing, in which a foreign firm licenses its technology to a single local firm, and multiple
licensing, in which the same technology is licensed to several local firms (Mirus, 1980).
Economic analysis of multiple licensing is largely ignored in the literature. Second, this
paper evaluates not only the payoffs to the foreign firm, but also the payoffs (social wel-
fare) to the host government. Unlike Contractor (1985a, 1985b), the payoff to the host
government in this paper is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and local producer
surplus. We will show that the payoffs are different under different strategies used by a
foreign firm. Finally, we base our analysis on a static as well as on a dynamic context.
As the analysis demonstrates, the preferred strategy used by foreign firms from the host
government's perspective is different in the two analyses.
Strategies to Serve a Foreign Market
The three basic strategies which international firms use to serve a foreign market are
(i) exporting from the home country, (ii) licensing the technology to a foreign producer,
and (iii) engaging in foreign direct investment (a wholly owned subsidiary). Since Hymer
(1976) discussed the merits and concerns of licensing technologies to host country firms,
researchers have devoted considerable attention to the question of why one strategy is
preferred to another (Hirsch, 1976; Mirus, 1980; Buckley and Casson, 1981; Rugman,
1981; Grosse, 1985; Contractor 1985a, 1985b; Teece, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986; Hill 1988).
Most of the research focuses on the costs associated with a particular strategy to
serve a foreign market; the preferred strategy is the one which yields the minimum total
cost. Looking at the cost of serving foreign markets by different strategies, Hirsch (1976),
Rugman (1981), and Buckley and Casson (1981) specify the conditions under which a firm
will choose a particular strategy. Recently, based upon a transaction costs framework,
Teece (1981, 1983, 1985, 1986) and Hill (1988) evaluate the impact of governance cost on
strategies in serving foreign markets. Due to different assumptions of costs, no consensus
can be reached. In addition, their research, which compares three basic strategies, can
be augmented by adding other strategies, such as joint venture and a combination of
joint venture and licensing. Furthermore, their work implicitly assumes that the revenues
generated by different market-serving strategies are the same. As Grosse (1985) pointed
out, a strategic choice based on cost minimization is not necessarily the one based upon
profit maximization. However, his model is too general to draw specific conclusions about
1 We address foreign production-related strategies only. Exporting is excluded from our
analyses because of the following reasons: (i) significant government restrictions, such as
tariffs and quotas; (ii) high volume of local demand; (iii) low level of economies of scale in
production, and (iv) high transportation costs.
a preferred strategy. In addition, like Hirsch, Rugman, Buckley and Casson, and Teece,
Grosse does not investigate the impact of these strategies from the host government's
perspective and does not explicitly examine strategic reactions to the host governments'
restrictions.
Recently, Contractor (1985a, 1985b) presented an algebraic model to examine the
gains to a foreign firm and to the host government when the foreign firm engages in a
joint venture with a firm in the host country. In the model, the foreign firm can be
compensated by a package involving some return on equity investment, royalties, and
margins on components or finished products traded with the joint venture firm. His model
clearly demonstrates that the payoffs to the foreign firm and to the host government
are different when different compensation packages are used. His model will be more
comprehensive if both producer surplus and consumer surplus are included in evaluating
the impact on the host country.
This paper evaluates serving a foreign market through foreign production-related
strategies with and without host governments' interventions. We first present a static
analysis which derives the payoffs to the foreign firm and the host government. The sec-
ond section extends the static analysis to a dynamic framework and discusses the strategic
implications.
The Model and the Static Analysis
We assume that the foreign firm faces a linear demand curve and that its production
exhibits a constant return to scale. This firm is planning to grow through international
horizontal integration (Teece, 1985,1986). Given a known linear demand curve in the host
country, the foreign firm has to decide upon its strategy to serve that market. We further
assume that there are no taxes and management costs abroad are minimal. 2 Based upon
these assumptions, a number of foreign production-related strategies will be discussed. For
each strategy, the profit of the foreign firm, the profit of the local firm(s) (local producer
surplus), and the welfare of the host country will be derived. A comparison of the payoffs
reveals the strategic implications for the foreign firm.
The firm's profit will be represented by 7r,
; ,
where » represents either the foreign firm
(f) or the local firm (1), and j describes the entry strategies; d is direct investment, el is
exclusive licensing, ml is multiple licensing, j is joint venture, and jl is a combined strategy
of joint venture and licensing.
Strategy 1: Foreign direct investment (a wholly-owned subsidiary).
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If we include governance costs, the conclusions may not be unambiguous.
Let P = a - bQ be the linear downward sloping demand curve, and c be the constant
average cost. 3 It is easy to show that the maximum profit of the foreign firm is
(a-cy
Kf.d =
46
and Q, the output level, is (a — c)/26, and P, the equilibrium price, is (a + c)/2. The
consumer surplus, CS, is
C5= I (0 _ P)Q =(!=_£
Since the foreign firm gets all the profits, the local producer surplus is zero. Therefore, the
social welfare of the host country, which is the sum of local producer surplus and consumer
surplus, is -—^-L~.
Strategy 2: Licensing.
Licensing, especially in licensing technologies, has been proposed as a strategic choice
to strengthen competitive position and increase a firm's profit (Caves et.al., 1983; Galanni
1984; Katz and Shapiro 1985; Shepard 1987). Two licensing strategies, exclusive and
multiple licensing, will be discussed below.
(l) Exclusive licensing
In this case, the local licensee enjoys the monopoly right and its cost becomes c + /,
where / is the per unit royalty rate of licensing. 4 The price (P), the output (Q), and profit
of the local firm 7r, el are
(i) P= (£±£±I)
(2) Q =^^
(3) *,,., -
Tb
3 This model is commonly used in economics and has been used in the international business
literature (e.g. Contractor, 1985a)
4
If we allow a two-part tariff for licensing fees, the case will be trivial. Here we assume
this trivial case does not exist. Given that host governments restrict license fees, this
assumption is realistic.
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Obviously, the profit of the local firm is a function of the unit royalty rate. The unit
royalty rate is determined by the profit function of the foreign firm which is
H) w„ m/ . Qm £St=±=&
Differentiating (4) against / and setting the result to zero yield the optimal unit royalty
rate for the foreign firm which is
(5) /-t^
Substituting (5) into (3) and (4) gives the profits of the local and foreign firm as follows:
(a-cf
""l.el
Kf.el
166
[a-cf
86
The social welfare for the host government (W) is the sum of consumer surplus plus local
producer surplus. Since the consumer surplus is CS = g^ » the social welfare of the
host country is
3(a-c-/) 2W = CS + 7y l
,
el
=-^ ^-LL-
_
3(a-c) 2
326
(2) Multiple licensing
Suppose that the foreign firm, either voluntarily or required by the host government,
licenses its technology to a number of local firms. As shown below, if the post licensing
market reaches a Cournot equilibrium, the foreign firm will license to as many local firms as
possible in order to maximize its licensing income. Consequently, after multiple licensing,
the market becomes competitive.
If the foreign firm licenses to n local firms, each local firm has the same constant
production cost c + /. The total output is
i= 1
where qt is the output of firm t. The profit function of firm i is
Ti = P<7, - (c + f)q.
Since p = a — bQ, the profit of firm i is
n
(6) 7T, = (a - 6^(7,)(7, - {c + f)qt
i= i
In the Cournot equilibrium, t3^ = 0. Thus, differentiating (6) with respect to qt gives
(7) —i = a - 26g, - 6V <?, - (c + /) =
In Cournot equilibrium, each local firm produces the same output, thus qt = q: = Q/n.
Therefore, (7) becomes
dq t
Consequently,
9, =
= a- 2bq, - (n - l)bqt - (c + /) =
(a-c-f)
(n + 1)6
and
n-„n - n (a
~ c
- f)
[n + 1)6
The foreign firms's licensing income 7T/,m j is
fn{a- c- f)
(8) xrml =fQ = {n+ 1)6
Differentiating (8) with respect to / and setting the result to zero gives / =
"
2
c
and
thus
n(a — c) 2
*'•"'
=
(n+l)46
Obviously, 7r7 m/ is an increasing function of n, the number of licensees. Therefore, the
foreign firm would like to license to as many local firms as possible and the local market
becomes competitive.
In a competitive market, the price should be equal to the cost of production. That
is, P = f + c and Q = (a — c — /)/6. Hence, the local producers earn no extra profits and
the local producer surplus is zero. 5 The profit of the foreign firms is
I (a-c-f)
(9) 7Tf.ml
5
If this is the case, there might be no incentive for local firms to obtain the license. However,
local firms face a prisoner's dilemma in this case. If other firms obtain the technology, firms
without it are in a disadvantageous competitive position.
Differentiating (9) with respect to / gives
, x , (a
_ c )
(io) / = ^—y1
Substituting (10) into (9) yields
_(a-cY
46
Comparing the profits generated from FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) and multiple
licensing, we find that both strategies are equally profitable to the foreign firm. Since the
prices are the same in both cases, the consumer surpluses are identical in these two cases.
The similar outcome for the foreign firm between FDI and multiple licensing indicates that
multiple licensing essentially allows the foreign firm to tax local firms and extract all the
monopoly profits.
Since local producer surplus is zero, the social welfare is consumer surplus which is
(a-c) 2 /86.
Strategy 3: Joint venture.
The foreign firm may form a joint venture with a local firm to enter the host country.
This venture enjoys the monopoly position in the host country. Let E be the percentage
of the equity held by the foreign firm. The profits of the foreign firm and the local firm are
their respective shares of the monopolist's total profits. As shown in the direct investment
case, the monopolist's profit is (a — c) 2 /4b. Thus, the profits of the foreign firm, 7r/o and
the profits of the local firm, tt,
,_,,
are
E(a - of
46
and
(l-g)(o-c)'
*•'
=
7b
The social welfare of the host country is CS + irltJi which is (3 - 2E)(a - c) 2 /86. Because
the revenue of the foreign firm is an increasing function of £", while the revenue of the local
firm and the social welfare of the host country is a decreasing function of £\ the interests
of the host country clearly conflict with the interests of the foreign firm.
6 The consumer surplus under licensing to n local firms is ^^^'^"^^ , which is also an
increasing function of n. Therefore, host governments also prefer the foreign firm to license
to as many local firms as possible.
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Strategy 4: Joint venture and licensing.
With the exception of Contractor (1985a, 1985b), previous researchers do not consider
the option that foreign firms may enter the host country by using two strategies simulta-
neously, i.e., forming a joint venture with a local firm and charging a license fee to that
venture. In this case, the venture determines the price and the output level els in the case
of exclusive licensing. However, the foreign firm, with an equity interest, can change its
license fee and share of equity holding to maximize its joint revenue from the licensing
agreement and from equity ownership.
In this case, the profit of the foreign firm is
(11) *f%jl = E*V + f*Q
(«-c-/) 5
where V is the profit of a local monopolist. From (3), V is equal to - b . Substituting
V and Q into (11) gives
(12) „ ,, =
*(-«-/)'
+
/(«-«-/)
V
'
ftli
46 26
The first order condition of (12) is
/
(13) E = l (a-c-f)
Equation (13) specifies the relationship between the share of equity holding and the unit
royalty rate when the foreign firm maximizes its profits. It is shown that the equity
holding is a substitute for the unit royalty rate and vice versa. In other words, if the host
government restricts the unit royalty rate, the foreign firm can offset the losses from a
lowering unit royalty rate by increasing the share of equity holding. As explained later,
this conclusion is very important to the foreign firm's strategy to serve a market.
We substitute (13) into (12) and then differentiate equation (12) with respect to E.
The result, dirftjl /dE, which is always greater than zero, indicates that the foreign firm's
profit is an increasing function of the share of equity holding. Therefore, the foreign firm
will try to hold as much equity as it can. Without the intervention of the host government,
total equity holding, i.e., a wholly-owned subsidiary, is always preferred to licensing.
The profit of the local firm in this scenario is 7r, j( = (1 - E)(a — c - f) 2 /4b. To this
we add the consumer surplus, (1 — E)(a — c — f) 2 /4b, and get the social welfare equal to
(1 - E)(a - c - f) 2 /4b + (a - c - /) 2 /86.
Table 1 presents the profit of the foreign firm, and the social welfare of the host
country under different strategies. This table is constructed under the assumption that
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the host government does not have any restrictions on the strategy used by the foreign
firm. A number of strategic implications for the foreign firm can be drawn from the table.
Insert Table 1 here
Strategic implications - static analysis
The foreign firm, as a profit maximizer, prefers the strategy which yields the highest
profits. As shown in Table 1, the returns of a wholly-owned subsidiary or of multiple
licensing are always higher than those of other strategies. Thus, as long as the foreign firm
has the freedom to choose its strategy, a wholly-owned subsidiary or multiple licensing
will be preferred. However, these are not optimal strategies for the host country. To
minimize the potential losses of social welfare, host governments usually intervene in the
entry decisions of foreign firms by imposing some restrictions. Japan and India are cases
in point (Ozawa, 1974; UNIDO, 1978).
The objective of the host government is to maximize social welfare. As our analysis
demonstrates, social welfare is different under different strategies used by foreign firms.
From the host government's perspective, Table 1 indicates that (1) exclusive licensing is
least preferred by the government, while joint venture with no licensing is most preferred,7
and (2) exclusive licensing is less preferable than FDI. This is probably the reason why
governments usually require local ownership as a precondition for the entry of foreign
firms. For example, foreign investors are not permitted to put in more than 50% of the
total capital required in Korea, although exceptions are made for some special lines of
industry (UNIDO, 1978).
In responding to host governments' restrictions, foreign firms have to change their
strategies to accommodate these political imperatives. Table 1 provides a basis on which
to formulate counter strategies when host governments intervene.
If the host government imposes a ban on FDI, the foreign firm can choose the multiple
licensing approach. In most developing countries there are no restrictions on multiple
licensing, and it is felt that exclusivity is a matter of negotiation between the foreign firm
and the local firm (UNIDO, 1978). Two special cases are Japan and India, with the former
discouraging multiple licensing and the latter encouraging it (Contractor, 1985b; UNIDO,
1978).
7 For example, if foreign equity holding is limited to 50%, host country's social welfare is
-^-^—
, which is the highest among different strategies.
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If the foreign firm cannot find enough local firms interested in its technology, the next
preferable strategy is to form a joint venture with a local firm and at the same time license
its technology to the venture. As shown in equation (13), different combinations of unit
royalty rate and equity holdings generate the same level of profit. For example, if the
foreign firm controls 50% of the venture, it will charge a unit royalty rate of (a — c)/3,
which is two-thirds of what it charges for exclusive licensing and multiple licensing. In
this case, the foreign firm's profit is ' ~
'
,
which is larger than the profits of exclusive
licensing and that with the joint venture less than two-thirds of the equity. One would
argue that the firm does not have to officially charge a license fee in this case because the
foreign firm can build the license fee into the prices of semi-finished products sold to the
venture. To achieve this goal, there have to be some tie-in agreements between the foreign
firm and the local firm. However, due to government restrictions, we seldom see firms
adopt this practice (UNIDO,1978). 8
According to equation (13), the reverse relationship between the equity share and the
unit royalty rate is shown in Figure 1. A foreign firm can adjust both amounts to maximize
its profit in the host country. If the host government sets maximum share of foreign equity
holding, the foreign firm can adjust its unit royalty rate according to equation (13) to
reach the highest revenue it can earn in the market. Similarly, the foreign firm can adjust
its share of equity holding when the host government restricts the unit royalty rate. For
example, in Figure 1, if the host government restricts foreign equity holding to E v , the
foreign firm can charge a unit royalty rate /j and vice versa. If the host government
restricts both unit royalty rate and foreign equity holding to /2 and E2 respectively, the
foreign firm will hold the maximum allowed equity share E2 , because the foreign firm's
revenue is an increasing function of E. Then, the foreign firm charges /3 as the unit royalty
rate. Thus, only when the host government imposes restrictions on both the share of equity
holding and the unit royalty rate is the foreign firm unable to maximize its profits in the
local market. 9
Insert Figure 1 here
8 See Contractor (1981) for cases of tie-in provisions which may be beneficial to the local
firm.
9 The host government can prohibit foreign licensing. This, however, will reduce the incen-
tive for foreign firms to transfer technologies. A royalty rate ceiling can increase foreign
firms' incentive to transfer technology and reduces the possibility of their exploitation of
the host country's welfare.
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The last two strategies examined in this study are joint venture and exclusive licens-
ing. They are less preferable than other strategies for foreign firms and, not surprisingly,
are encouraged in most countries. According to our analysis, exclusive licensing is the
least preferable when other strategies are available to the foreign firm. This result is in
line with most of the findings in the international business literature (e.g., Buckley and
Casson, 1981). When local demand is large, thus warranting local production, foreign firms
always switch from licensing to other local production-related strategies. In summary, the
preference of strategies to serve a market by a foreign firm in a descending order would
be : foreign direct investment or multiple licensing, a combination of joint venture and
licensing, joint venture, and exclusive licensing. The final choice of a specific strategy may
depend on the restrictions of the host government and the bargaining power of the firm
(Doz and Prahalad, 1981).
The above analyses are in a static framework. The next section examines whether the
above conclusions still hold in a dynamic context.
Dynamic Analysis
The primary difference between a static and a dynamic analysis is the issue of control
of the interest. Under licensing, a local firm may take several years to learn the technology
from a foreign firm, but after that period, this local firm can be independent of the foreign
firm. Unlike the case of licensing, a wholly-owned subsidiary (foreign direct investment)
will always be controlled by a foreign firm. In the following discussion, we deal with four
foreign production-related strategies in a dynamic framework: exclusive licensing, multiple
licensing, FDI, and joint venture with 50 percent limitation on foreign equity holding and
no licensing. 10 Base upon the results in the previous analysis, the payoffs to the foreign
firm and the host government will be derived and compared.
Strategy 1: Exclusive licensing.
We assume that the exclusive agreement lasts T years and that after year T, the
licensee (local firm) is able to gain control of the technology and the market either through
government protection or through efficient operations. Since the profit of the foreign firm
in each year is (a — c) 2 /8b, the discounted revenue for T years is
T/.ei = /
Jo 8b
(a-cV 1 e- T
8b [ r r '
10 Most countries limit foreign ownership to 50% of a joint venture. India is an exception
with 40% maximum ownership.
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where r is the discount rate. The social welfare of the host country is composed of two
parts. The first part is the discounted social welfare for the first T years when the local firm
depends on the foreign firm. The social welfare in each year is the sum of the consumer
surplus and the producer surplus. The second part is the discounted social welfare after
year T when the local firm is no longer dependent on the foreign firm and thus does not
pay license fees. Hence, the social welfare of the host government will be equal to
3(a _ c )2 r°o 3/ _ \2
-e-
rt dt- ^
—
—^e- rt dt
Jo 326 JT
3(o
-cf r 9(a-c)a
326r 326r
Strategy 2: Multiple licensing.
Similarly, the discounted profit of the foreign firm under multiple licensing is
Jo
* («-«>%-«*
46
(a-cf 1 e~'T
46 l r r )
The social welfare of the host government is (a — c) 2 /86 from time zero to T. After the
license expires, the consumer surplus is the surplus of a competitive market with a price
equal to c. The consumer surplus is (a — c) 2 /2b. Therefore,
'(—)•. n-i',.,
'-[Hp™+L 26
(a-c) 2 1 3e-^
86 V r '
Strategy 3: Foreign direct investment.
The foreign firm will control the local market forever under FDI. The profit of the
foreign firm and the social welfare of the host country are
r <a -'>%-««= (*- e>
:
46 46r
and
w=l f£Z&,-r.*-A—>Y
-t: 86 86r
Strategy 4: Joint venture with 50 percent foreign ownership.
As discussed before, because foreign firms can manipulate equity ownership and li-
censing fees to reach their profit goals, host governments should ban the foreign licensing
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practice in order to gain a higher level of social welfare. We assume that the host govern-
ment limits foreign ownership to 50%. Because the foreign firm will receive the revenue
from the local venture for an unlimited time, its discounted profit is
Jo
<
a - c
>V- d(
86
(g - c)
2
Sbr
The social welfare of the host government will be
Ab
2
_
(a
~ C )
Abr
Table 2 summarizes the payoff to the foreign firm and the host government under four
foreign production-related strategies in a dynamic context. While the foreign firms prefers
FDI, the host government apparently has a different preference. Hence, the interests of
the foreign firm and the host government are in conflict.
Strategic Implications - Dynamic analysis
As Table 2 demonstrates, the most preferred strategy of the foreign firm is FDI, which
is consistent with the static analysis. If FDI is not possible, the foreign firm will choose
either multiple licensing or 50 percent joint venture, depending upon the discount rate
and the period of multiple licensing. Subtracting nf } from 7r; m( gives ((a — c)
2 (l/2 —
e~
rr ))/46r. Ue~ rT is greater than 1/2, the joint venture strategy is preferred. This means
that as long as rT is less than 0.693, foreign firms will prefer joint venture. For example,
when r = 0.12 and if the multiple licensing agreement will last less than 6 years, then
the foreign firm should engage in joint venture because it yields more discounted profit
than multiple licensing. Thus, other things being equal, the higher the discount rate, or
the shorter the possible period of multiple licensing, the higher the possibility of a joint
venture. Only when other strategies are not available, will a foreign firm serve a country
through exclusive licensing.
Insert Table 2 here
Comparing the social welfare generated by each strategy, the preference of the host
government are as follows:
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(1) FDI is less preferable than multiple licensing and joint venture.
(2) Multiple licensing is always preferred to exclusive licensing.
(3) From (l) and (2) it appears that the host government will prefer multiple licensing
and joint venture because, in most cases, these two strategies of foreign firms yield a higher
level of social welfare.
Because the strategy to maximize pay-offs is not the same for the foreign firm and the
host government, in attempting to increase the social welfare, the host government will
set up some restrictions to intervene in the foreign firm's strategy. The strategies of the
foreign firm under different restrictions are discussed below.
(1) With no government restrictions on ownership, the foreign firm should own one
hundred percent of the local subsidiary.
(2) Suppose the host government only restricts foreign ownership and enforces no
restrictions on the period of multiple licensing agreements, then the foreign firm should
weigh the gains from joint venture and multiple licensing. There are three decision vari-
ables: the allowed share of foreign ownership, the discount rate, and the possible period
of the licensing agreement.
For example, if the allowed share of foreign ownership is 50 percent, and the discount
rate used by the foreign firms is 10 percent, then the foreign firm could maximize its profit
by adopting the strategy of joint venture when the possible period of a multiple licensing
agreement is longer than 6 years.
(3) Suppose the host government regulates foreign ownership as well as the period
of multiple licensing agreement, then a foreign firm has to evaluate the government's
preference very carefully. Table 3 demonstrates the preferences of a host government and
a foreign firm when the foreign ownership is restricted to 50 percent. For example, if
the discount rate is 12 percent, the foreign firm prefers joint venture when the period of
licensing is less than 5.8 years while the host government prefers the joint venture approach
when the period is longer than 9.2 years. Clearly both parties have ranges of agreement
and disagreement.
Insert Table 3 here
When the licensing period is between 5.8 and 9.2 years, both the foreign firm and the
host government prefer multiple licensing. However, if the licensing period is longer than
9.2 years, or less than 5.8 years, the foreign firm and the host government have different
preferences. Due to this difference, again, final resolution may depend upon the nature
of technology involved, the capabilities of the local firm to learn the technology, and the
16
bargaining power of the two parties (Balasubramanyam 1973; Ozawa 1974, Mytelka 1978,
Doz and Prahalad 1981)
(4) In any situation, joint ventures and exclusive licensing are still available to foreign
firms. Clearly the deciding factors are the share of foreign ownership allowed and the
period of licensing. Comparing the payoffs to these strategies reveals that, the higher the
share of ownership, and the shorter the possible period of an exclusive licensing, the higher
the payoffs to a joint venture strategy.
CONCLUSION
We have investigated the impact of different foreign production-related market-serving
strategies on foreign firms. Our analysis includes both static and dynamic contexts. As
we have demonstrated, the interests of foreign firms and host governments are in conflict
in both contexts.
The optimal strategies for foreign firms and host governments are different under
these two contexts. In both the static and the dynamic framework, with no government
restriction, FDI is preferred by foreign firms. However, host governments usually enforce
some restrictions on the strategies used by foreign firms. Given these restrictions, foreign
firms must formulate counter strategies. If total ownership is not allowed, as is the case in
many countries, foreign firms may be able to extract more profits by using other strategies,
such as a strategy of combining joint venture and licensing as described in Figure 1.
Due to the conflicting positions of these two parties, the ultimate outcome is partially
determined by the relative bargaining position of the foreign firm with respect to the
host government. However, host governments usually give more leeway to foreign firms
to encourage them to operate in these markets. For example, host governments may
allow equity ownership and license at the same time but impose limits on license fees and
ownerships (UNIDO 1978; UNCYAD 1978).
This paper has a number of limitations. First, many advanced technologies do exhibit
significant economies of scale. This may not be a problem for exclusive licensing, joint
venture, and FDI for large economies such as Japan and China. However, this could be a
problem in the case of multiple licensing, because multiple licensees may not be available.
Second, transaction costs and taxes are not included in the model. 11 It is not difficult to
incorporate these variables into the model, but adding more parameters in the model may
lead to nonconclusive results. Finally, in our dynamic analysis, the size of local market
11 Without considering transaction costs, our model demonstrates the superiority of FDI.
Incorporating transaction costs as discussed in Teece (1981, 1983, 1985, 1986), our results
continue to favor FDI, especially for sophisticated technologies.
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is assumed to be constant. Some markets, especially in developing countries, grow at a
phenomenal rate which may change our conclusions.
This paper opens many research avenues, both theoretical and empirical. Theoreti-
cally, many assumptions can be relaxed and more complicated models can be constructed
to explore differences in market-serving strategies between industries such as the semi-
conductor and pharmaceutical industries. Empirically, this paper can be used to explain
foreign entry behavior in countries with different host government restrictions. For exam-
ple, one may compare the difference in entry behavior between countries with almost no
regulations (e.g. U.S.) and heavily regulated countries (e.g. Japan). This model can also
be modified to examine the switch of strategies in serving a market when the local market
grows. Finally, the role of local firms in influencing foreign entries requires more analysis.
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Table 3
COMPARISON OF PREFERENCES
ML = Multiple Licensing
HOST GOVERNMENT ENTERING FIRM
DISCOUNT RATE Favor ML* when T < Favor ML* when T <
.10 11.0 6.9
.12 9.2 5.8
.15 7.3 4.6
.20 5.5 3.5
Royalty Rate (f)
A
a-c
a-c
1/4
E E
1/2
2 l
* Equity Holi
1 (E)
Figure 1 Relationship between royalty rates and share of
equity holding
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